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Abstract. Federal and state courts have failed to fully address inadequate funding for public
defenders as a hurdle to the right to effective assistance of counsel—as opposed to the right to mere
assistance of counsel. Courts view denials of this right as due process violations and embark on
individualistic analyses. However, precedent indicates that equal protection, which is inherently
comparative and provides for a more systemic lens, also comes into play with the right to be
represented by an attorney when facing the full weight of the criminal justice system. By reframing
the issue and moving the discussion from due process to equal protection, advocates seeking relief
for public defender offices and their clients can take advantage of—and reframe courts’
understanding of—studies demonstrating that, as currently funded, public defenders cannot
adequately represent their clients in line with their ethical obligations.
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INTRODUCTION: STATING THE PROBLEM
Approximately thirty years ago, New Orleans public defender Mark Teissier filed a “Motion
for Relief to Provide Constitutionally Mandated Protection and Resources,”1 or as Time put it, “he
filed suit against himself.”2 Alleging that the lack of adequate funding for public defense within his
section of New Orleans Criminal District Court unconstitutionally deprived his clients of reasonably
effective assistance of counsel, he noted that within an eight-month period, he represented 418
defendants, typically received no investigative support or funds for expert testimony, and worked in
an inadequate law library.3 His motion made it all the way up to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which
determined that indigent defendants within Mr. Teissier’s section routinely went without effective
assistance of counsel.4 However, because the court decided that the true inquiry in the case was
“whether an individual defendant has been provided with reasonable effective assistance,”5 the remedy
for the deprivation was individual—a rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance for Mr.
Teissier’s clients alone.6 If, on remand, after hearing individual motions by Mr. Teissier’s clients, a
trial court found that they were not receiving effective assistance and could not order any other
appropriate remedy, the trial court, as a last resort, was instructed to not permit prosecutions until
effective assistance was provided.7 The court noted that “because this Court should not lightly tread
in the affairs of other branches of government and because the legislature ought to assess such
measures in the first instance,” it would “decline at this time” to “employ more intrusive and specific
measures it has thus far avoided to ensure that indigent defendants receive reasonably effective
assistance of counsel.”8
Evidently, the Peart decision did not turn out to be a panacea. A 2017 study, based on the
informed opinions of seasoned Louisiana criminal defense lawyers, found that in order to provide
representation that complies with the Louisiana Public Defender Board Trial Court Performance
Standards, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, and the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct,
Louisiana’s public defense system would need approximately 1,769 full-time public defenders.9 In
2016, the equivalent of 363 full-time public defenders worked in the Louisiana public defense
system—a mere twenty percent of the defenders needed to comply with professional norms and
ethics rules.10 In other states, the results of similar studies yield similar results. In Rhode Island, public
defenders were found to be able to handle thirty-six percent of their total workload in compliance.11
1

State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780, 784 (La. 1993).

2

Jill Smolowe, The Trials of the Public Defender, 141 TIME 13, 48 (1993).

3

Peart, 621 So.2d at 784.

4

Id. at 790.

5

Id. at 788.

6

Id. at 791.

7

Id. at 791-92.

8

Id. at 791.

9

THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS &
POSTLETHWAITE AND NETTERVILLE, APAC, THE LOUISIANA PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE LOUISIANA PUBLIC DEFENDER
SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 2 (2017) (hereinafter The Louisiana Project).
10

Id. at 21.

11

BLUM SHAPIRO, THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS & THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, THE RHODE ISLAND PROJECT: A STUDY
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In Colorado, while public defenders are mostly in compliance with their handling of first-degree
felony cases, that compliance is at the expense of almost every other type of case public defenders
handle.12
The Colorado study is indicative of the important concept of triage in public defense. The
term is a purposeful reference to emergency rooms: due to limited resources, health care providers
give the gravest cases priority and attention at the expense of others.13 A similar system occurs in
public defender offices, where some clients are pled out or tried haphazardly and others receive
zealous advocacy.14 The Peart opinion unknowingly described this phenomenon in passing, noting,
“[t]hat Peart himself could receive effective assistance, while Teissier’s other clients do not, reflects
the fact that indigent defenders must select certain clients to whom they give more attention than
they give to others.”15
Armed with the 2017 Louisiana study and the triage problem, the Chief Indigent Defender
in the East Baton Rouge Parish’s public defender office, in State v. Covington, moved to reduce
caseloads by withdrawing from current representations and declining new ones.16 On appeal, the
Louisiana Supreme Court noted that Peart requires an individual, fact-specific analysis for how an
attorney handled a specific case, rather than considering other cases or their overall workload.17
According to the majority, the Louisiana study only defined how many hours of work a public
defender should put in per case (depending on the type).18 The study did not provide the case-specific
information Peart requires, and the movant did not provide other information that would satisfy this
burden.19 Therefore, the court denied relief.20
Although the court in Peart recognized the problem, it did very little to address it. Its
remedy, based on individual determinations for each client’s case, was hamstrung from the beginning
by the individualized findings requirement.21 The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision demonstrated
this in the clearest terms possible. 22 The root of the problem is not the actions of individual public
defenders, but inadequate funding for indigent defense. It is a systemic problem, one that courts,
blinded by a focus on individual determinations under an individualistic understanding of the right to
counsel, has failed to understand, let alone grant a remedy to address in full.
OF THE RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS

26 (2017).

12

Compare RUBIN BROWN & THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, THE COLORADO PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE COLORADO PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM AND
ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 22 (2017) with id. at 23.
13
See, e.g., L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE. L.J. 2626,
2632 (2013).
14
See id. (“However, most PDs do not work in an ideal environment. They cannot realistically provide each client
with zealous and effective advocacy. PDs are forced by circumstances to engage in triage, i.e., determining which clients merit
attention and which do not.”)
15

Peart, 621 So.2d at 785 n.4.

16

State v. Covington, 2020-00447 (La. 12/1/20), 318 So. 3d 21, 22.

17

Id. at 23.

18

Id. at 25.

19

Id.

20

Id. at 27.

21

Peart, 621 So.2d at 791-92.

22

See Covington, 318 So. 3d at 27.
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Recognizing that, compared to the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court envisions
disparities more as Equal Protection Clause violations, 23 this paper will attempt to reconstruct and
reframe the right to effective assistance of counsel. By detailing a more equal protection-focused
equal justice framework, this paper will demonstrate how courts can better see systemic issues.
Section II will summarize the Court’s current jurisprudence on the right to counsel and ineffective
assistance of counsel. Section III will discuss the inner workings and outer bounds of the Court’s
potentially more profitable equal justice framework. Section IV will combine the two lines of cases to
find a comparative, systems-based approach to assessing funding’s relationship to ineffective
assistance of counsel. Finally, Section V will provide an example of how this line of argument could
work in practice and discuss how it must be framed in light of Covington.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL
A. From Powell to Gideon
A complete understanding of the development of the constitutionally-mandated right to
publicly funded counsel must begin with the story of the Scottsboro Boys and the case of Powell v.
Alabama.24 The story begins with seven white boys, two white girls, and nine Black boys riding on a
freight train passing through Alabama.25 Following a fight, the white boys walked back to the station
and alleged the Black boys, ages 13 to 20, had thrown them off the train. The station master then
called ahead, arranging for the Black boys to be removed at the next stop. 26 The two white girls told
the responding sheriff’s posse that the Black boys had sexually assaulted them, causing the boys to be
arrested and taken to the jail in Scottsboro. 27 While in custody, a lynch mob of hundreds gathered
outside of the jail, opposed by armed guards sent by the state and eventually leading to the boys being
moved to a nearby jail for safekeeping during the course of trial. 28 Before the trial, local papers took
the side of the alleged victims—the white girls on the train, treating their accusation as truth and
describing the alleged incident as “the most atrocious ever recorded in this part of the country. . . .”29
During the trial, a crowd of anywhere from five to ten thousand gathered outside of a courthouse
fortified by armed guards.30
On the day the trial was set to begin, an issue emerged within the courtroom—the status of
the defendants’ legal representation.31 The trial judge appointed all members of the local bar to
represent the defendants at arraignment, but did not explicitly state if they were to represent the
23

See infra Section IV (pp. 15-22).

24

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

25

Id. at 50-51; Michael J. Klarman, Powell v. Alabama: The Supreme Court Confronts “Legal Lynchings,” in CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE STORIES 1 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2005).
26

Powell, 287 U.S. at 50-51; Klarman, supra note 25, at 1.

27

Klarman, supra note 25, at 1.

28

Id. at 1-2.

29

Id. at 3.

30

Id.

31

Powell, 287 U.S. at 53-54.
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defendants at trial.32 At the same time, the defendants’ families sent a Tennessee attorney, unfamiliar
with Alabama criminal procedure, unprepared for the case, and only intending to serve as a second
chair, to look after the defendants’ interests.33 Therefore, when the case was called, no one answered
for the defendants.34 Following a discussion of these circumstances between the presiding judge, a
local attorney, and the Tennessee attorney, it was decided that the local attorney would assist the
Tennessee attorney.35 The Tennessee attorney had less than thirty minutes to meet with his clients
before the trials began.36
The Supreme Court took notice of these dire circumstances, writing:
The defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate, surrounded by hostile sentiment, haled
back and forth under guard of soldiers, charged with an atrocious crime regarded
with especial horror in the community where they were to be tried, were thus put
in peril of their lives within a few moments after counsel for the first time charged
with any degree of responsibility began to represent them. It is not enough to
assume that counsel thus precipitated into the case thought there was no defense,
and exercised their best judgment in proceeding to trial without preparation.
Neither they nor the court could say what a prompt and thorough-going
investigation might disclose as to the facts. No attempt was made to investigate.
No opportunity to do so was given. Defendants were immediately hurried to
trial. . . . The record indicates that the appearance was rather pro forma than
zealous and active. . . .37
The Court held that in capital cases, where a defendant cannot furnish their own
representation, and, due to ignorance, illiteracy, or another mitigating factor, cannot adequately
defend themself, the presiding court has a duty to assign counsel as a matter of due process. 38
Moreover, this duty goes unsatisfied if the court, like in the case of the Scottsboro boys, assigns
counsel in a manner that prevents them from adequately preparing a defense. 39 As the Court
explained in Powell, if the average layman, lacking legal training, would struggle to prepare a successful
defense and present it in a legally sufficient manner, even less can be said of an “ignorant and
illiterate” defendant.40 Thus, the due process right to be heard would do very little if it did not include
a right to be heard while represented by counsel. 41
While rooted in due process rather than equal protection, Powell v. Alabama establishes the
Court’s specific concern for society’s most vulnerable going without effective assistance of counsel.
32

Id. at 56.

33

Id. at 57; Klarman, supra note 25, at 3.

34

Powell, 287 U.S. at 53.

35

Id. at 53-56.

36

Klarman, supra note 25, at 4.

37

Powell, 287 U.S. at 57-58.

38

Id. at 71.

39

Id.

40

Id. at 69.

41

Id. at 68-69.
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Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court, in finding that that the Sixth Amendment served as a
jurisdictional bar for federal courts to hear cases unless a defendant has the assistance of counsel or
has waived that right, cited somewhat similar concerns.42 It described the Sixth Amendment as
“embod[ying] a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the
professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel.”43 In Johnson, the
Court expanded the logic of Powell, clarifying that even for the average defendant, the disparity
between an unrepresented defendant and a trained prosecution is too much to accept.
Finally, in the oft-discussed Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court incorporated its previous holding
in Johnson to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, explicitly
grounding its analysis in Powell.44 However, unlike in Powell and Johnson, where it is subtext, the Court
in Gideon brought an equality-based concern about separate justice systems divided by wealth to the
forefront.45 The Court first noted that both the government and defendants who can afford to do so
invariably hire lawyers to represent their interests.46 The Court understood this to indicate that
counsel in criminal court is a necessity.47 It then wrote:
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid
great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair
trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This
noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his
accusers without a lawyer to assist him. 48
In other words, if the Court’s notions of fairness are to mean anything, they must come with
a degree of ensured equality, regardless of wealth.
B. Strickland and Cronic
In a footnote to its decision in McMann v. Richardson, a case dealing with allegedly coerced
guilty pleas in a petition for habeas relief49, the Court, citing a line of cases going all the way back to
Powell, made a key observation: “[i]t has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to
the effective assistance of counsel.”50 Fourteen years later, this footnote would serve as a jumping-off
point for Strickland v. Washington and United States v. Cronic, the two cases that define a court’s inquiry

42

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938).

43

Id. at 462-63.

44

See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963).

45

Id. at 344.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id. (emphasis added).

49

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 760 (1970)

50

McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14 (1970) (citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60, 70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932).
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into ineffective assistance of counsel claims.51
Under Strickland, a court’s inquiry proceeds in two parts. In part one, a defendant must show
that their counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an “objective standard of
reasonableness,” as defined by “prevailing professional norms.”52 This performance assessment must
be made from the perspective of counsel at the time of the representation and with consideration of
all the circumstances.53 While the first inquiry has to do with professional norms, publications like
American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice are merely to be considered as guidelines
rather than dispositive answers.54 As the Court explained, “[n]o particular set of detailed rules for
counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense
counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.”55
The second inquiry asks whether, considering all of the evidence before the factfinder, it is reasonably
likely that the defense counsel’s error impacted the outcome of the case, prejudicing the defendant. 56
Critically, however, the Court noted that courts embarking on a Strickland inquiry can approach the
two prongs in either order and decline to reach the second if the first is insufficient. 57 More
specifically, courts do not need to rule on reasonableness if they find that counsel’s alleged failures
did not prejudice the defendant.58 The Court clearly stated its reason for this clarification, explaining
that “[c]ourts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to
defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.”59
Cronic’s inquiry is best defined as a shortcut through Strickland. Instead of delving into the
trial record to determine if the defense counsel’s alleged failure did, in fact, prejudice the defendant, it
asks if the failure is so extreme as to allow a court to presume prejudice.60 The Court in Cronic cited
Powell as an example of this kind of failure.61 It characterized Powell as a case where, although
physically present at trial, a fully competent attorney, due to the surrounding circumstances—in that
case, the short notice that counsel was given to prepare to represent the defendants—would very
likely be incapable of providing effective assistance.62
II. EQUAL JUSTICE AND ITS OUTER LIMITS
At the same time that the Supreme Court was fleshing out the right to counsel under the
Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it was also developing an

51

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984).

52

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

53

Id. at 688-69.

54

Id. at 688.

55

Id. at 688-89.

56

Id. at 692-95.

57

Id. at 697.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60.

61

Id. at 660-61.

62

Id.
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Equal Protection Clause-based framework for equality in the criminal justice system. Griffin v. Illinois63
and Douglas v. California64 served as the two hallmark cases of this burgeoning framework. The later
decisions in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez65 and Ross v. Moffitt66 defined its limits.
Nevertheless, the Equal Protection Clause can still have a place in ensuring equal justice between the
rich and the poor.
A. Griffin and Douglas
The petitioners in Griffin v. Illinois sought to overturn their state court armed robbery
convictions on direct appeal.67 In order to do so, they were required to provide the appellate court
with materials that could likely only be created by referencing a full stenographic transcript of the
lower court proceedings.68 Except for indigent defendants sentenced to death, all defendants,
regardless of indigency, were required to purchase the transcript.69 Referring to the requirement as a
form of invidious discrimination, the Court found that it violated both equal protection and due
process,70 even though there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to appellate review. 71 Remarking
that providing equal justice, regardless of wealth or status, is a timeless issue, the Court explained that
both due process and equal protection analyses emphasize that all defendants must “stand on an
equality before the bar of justice in every American court.”72 Because the ability to pay has no bearing
on guilt or innocence, a state criminal court cannot discriminate on the basis of poverty, in the same
way it cannot discriminate on the basis of religion or race.73 In its strongest language, the Court noted
that “[t]here is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to
defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate
review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in advance.”74 At the same time,
while the lower court may require that the petitioners be provided a transcript, Griffin’s holding only
requires that indigent defendants be provided some means of obtaining “adequate and effective
appellate review.”75 Those means do not necessarily have to include a full stenographic transcript.76
In Douglas v. California, the indigent petitioners, who were convicted of multiple felonies,

63

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956).

64

Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).

65

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 13 (1973).

66

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-612 (1974).

67

Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13.

68

Id. at 13-14.

69

Id. at 14.

70

While the court did not go into much detail about how equal protection and due process separately came into play
in Griffin, it later treated Griffin and Douglas as more in line with an equal protection analysis. See infra p. 11-12 and note 76.
71

Id. at 18.

72

Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)).

73

Id. at 17-18.

74

Id. at 18.

75

See id. at 19-20.

76

See id. at 20.
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sought counsel for their direct appeals to the California District Court of Appeal. 77 Under a California
criminal procedure rule, before granting assistance of counsel to an indigent appellant, the appellate
court may investigate the record to determine if the assistance of counsel would help the reviewing
court or the appealing defendant.78 Citing to Griffin and taking care to note that equal protection does
not require “absolute equality,” the Court held that the initial pass through the record before deciding
to grant counsel, as well as the potential result of an indigent defendant going through their one
appeal as of right without the assistance of counsel, are contrary to both the equal protection
guarantee against invidious discrimination and the due process guarantee of fair procedure.79 The
majority’s opinion ends with the following explanation of the California rule’s impact:
The present case, where counsel was denied petitioners on appeal, shows that the
discrimination is not between “possibly good and obviously bad cases,” but
between cases where the rich man can require the court to listen to argument of
counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man cannot. There is
lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man,
who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel’s examination into the
record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the
indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without
merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or
the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man
has a meaningful appeal.80
B. San Antonio and Ross
Unlike the previously discussed cases, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez dealt
not with criminal justice, but with public school financing. The district court ruled in favor of
petitioners, parents of children in the poorest school district in the San Antonio area, based on the
Equal Protection Clause, holding that unequal per-student funding from local, state, and federal
sources discriminated along two dimensions—the disbursement of education and wealth as a suspect
classification.81 The Supreme Court disagreed with both theories.82 There is no right to education
explicitly or implicitly found in the Constitution, nor was the funding disparity similar to the denials
of the right to vote at issue in cases like Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.83 In addition, the
Court declined to recognize a cognizable wealth discrimination claim, explaining that in its previous
cases, those alleging discrimination “shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their
impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, they
sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.”84 In San Antonio,
77

Douglas, 372 U.S. at 353-54.

78

Id. at 355.

79

Id. at 355-57.

80

Id. at 357-58.

81

San Antonio, 411 U.S at 4-6, 11-12, 15-17.

82

Id. at 18.

83

Id. at 34, 34 n.74.

84

Id. at 20.
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the respondents could not point to “any class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed of persons
whose incomes are beneath any designated poverty level.”85 Furthermore, because the respondents’
children were still receiving an education, albeit one arguably of a poorer quality, there was no
absolute deprivation.86
While San Antonio was a major setback to many equity-minded causes, the equal justice
inquiry was explicitly not one of them. In developing its “unable to pay” and “absolute deprivation”
standard, the Court began with Griffin and Douglas, citing positively to them as a “proper starting
point.”87 Moreover, the Court relied on a line of equal justice cases going back to Douglas to support
the proposition that “where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute
equality or precisely equal advantages.”88 To this day, courts still discuss and rule based on the
relationship between Griffin and its progeny and San Antonio.89
Ross v. Moffitt, decided the year after San Antonio, serves as an example of the level of equality
required by the equal justice framework. 90 In Ross, the respondent challenged the denial of counsel
during a discretionary appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court and a petition for a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that these procedures violated Douglas.91
Indeed, in Douglas, the Court explicitly did not reach the right to counsel on discretionary appeals. 92
Here, the question was resolved and it was determined that neither the Due Process Clause nor the
Equal Protection Clause affords the right to counsel for discretionary appeals. 93 For the due process
analysis, the Court explained that unlike in trial courts, defendants are not dragged into court and in
need of protection from the state. 94 Instead, appealing defendants initiate the proceedings. 95
85

Id. at 22-23.

86

Id. at 23.

87

Id. at 20-21.

88

Id. at 24, 24 n.57.

89

See, e.g., Wright v. Fam. Support Div. of Mo. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 458 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1108 (E.D. Mo. 2020)
(explaining that “[t]he test in [San Antonio] establishes the threshold requirements for determining whether a class of indigent
individuals is subject to heightened scrutiny” and “[i]f these requirements are met, then the Court must determine whether the
class falls within the confines of the Griffin line of cases”); Mendoza v. Keane, No. 04 CV 585 (ARR), 2006 WL 3050872, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006), aff’d, 330 F. App’x 215 (2d Cir. 2009) (including San Antonio in a list of cases, including Griffin and
Douglas, where “state laws and procedures [] created barriers to the exercise of [the right to counsel] by indigent defendants”).
90

Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). For another example, see Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971), where
the Court determined that for a retrial in a small town involving the same judge, counsel, and court reporter and taking place
one month after the first trial, the defendant was not entitled to a free transcript of the first trial. Instead, adequate alternatives,
like defense counsel informally requesting the court reporter to read back his notes, were good enough to survive an equal
protection challenge. Id. at 229.
91

Ross, 417 U.S. at 602-05.

92

See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356 (internal citation omitted) (“We need not now decide whether California would have to
provide counsel for an indigent seeking a discretionary hearing from the California Supreme Court after the District Court of
Appeal had sustained his conviction, or whether counsel must be appointed for an indigent seeking review of an appellate
affirmance of his conviction in this Court by appeal as of right or by petition for a writ of certiorari which lies within the
Court’s discretion.”).
93

Ross, 417 U.S. at 609.

94

Id. at 610-11.

95

Id.
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Beginning with citations to San Antonio and Griffin, the Court explained that the Equal Protection
Clause does not require absolute equality or equalized economic conditions, and it does not tolerate
distinctions lacking in reason that prevent indigents the ability to present their claims. 96 In contrast to
Douglas, the respondent had the benefit of counsel to look over his claim for a first appeal, providing
him, at the very least, a record of the trial court’s proceedings, a brief by appellate counsel, and an
opinion by the appellate court.97 According to the majority, those materials, supplemented by a pro se
brief, were enough for the North Carolina Supreme Court to decide if it would review the case.98
Moreover, unlike lower court review or trial proceedings, the decision to grant or deny an appeal to
the North Carolina or United States Supreme Court does not consider if there was “a correct
adjudication of guilt.”99 Instead, other factors, like the public interest in the legal issue, come into
play.100
III. FUNDED, EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE UNDER AN EQUAL JUSTICE FRAMEWORK
The advantage of the equal justice framework over the traditional due process analysis is
that it contains a greater focus on equal protection, which has a more comparative lens. As the Ross
majority explained, “[d]ue process emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing
with the State, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be treated” while
“[e]qual protection, on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in treatment by a State between classes
of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable.”101 By recreating the outcomes of the
Powell line under equal justice, one can reframe the issue. There are no systemic barriers that prevent a
defendant who can afford retained counsel—who, in turn, has either control over their workload or
recourse for refusing a case 102—from receiving effective assistance of counsel. At the same time, a
similarly situated defendant who must rely on a public defender—whose workload is out of their
control and set by the number of prosecutions—is faced with systemic barriers that relegate them to
only receiving constitutionally impermissible ineffective assistance.
A. A Right to Counsel Located Under Equal Justice
A right to counsel resembling the one in Gideon can be found under the Griffin-Douglas equal
justice framework in two ways. First, Gideon, especially when read in comparison with Powell, can be
understood as applying this framework, thus embracing its inner and outer bounds. Second, even
absent Gideon, the right to counsel exists under the Griffin-Douglas line.
In terms of constitutional location, the equal justice line of cases and the more traditional
right to counsel cases (Powell through Gideon) both blend the logics of equal protection and due
process. Professor Brandon L. Garrett, using a framework he developed with Professor Kerry
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Abrams, suggested that Griffin and Douglas are “intersectional rights” cases, meaning that the action at
issue violated more than one provision of the Constitution in a manner that they must be “read to
inform and bolster one another.”103 Under this framework, examples of intersectional rights include
penumbra cases like Griswold v. Connecticut, “fundamental rights equal protection” cases like Zablocki v.
Redhail, and Justice Kennedy’s majority opinions in LGBTQ+ rights cases like Romer v. Evans, Lawrence
v. Texas, United States v. Windsor, and Obergefell v. Hodges.104 Professor Garrett cited to the Court’s
comments in Ross, where the majority noted the conceptual differences between the Equal Protection
Clause and the Due Process Clause105 and stated that neither “provide[] an entirely satisfactory basis
for the result[s] reached” in Griffin and Douglas.106 He posited that, unlike in Ross, the Court in Griffin
and Douglas engaged in an intersectional rights analysis.107
Professor Garrett’s characterization of Griffin and Douglas is in line with subsequent
descriptions of the decisions by the Supreme Court. In San Antonio, the Court characterized Griffin
and Douglas as suspect classification equal protection cases.108 Soon after, in Maher v. Roe, the Court, in
explaining that financial need alone does not create a suspect class, noted that its “subsequent
decisions have made it clear that the principles underlying Griffin and Douglas do not extend to
legislative classifications generally” because they “are grounded in the criminal justice system, a
governmental monopoly in which participation is compelled.”109
Although officially placing their holdings under only the Due Process Clause, the Court, by
the time it decided Gideon, was implicitly using an intersectional rights analysis incorporating due
process and equal protection to find a right to counsel. Under Ross, due process deals with fairness
between the individual and the state, and has no regard for how similarly situated individuals are
treated.110 Equal protection, on the other hand, focuses only on how similarly situated individuals are
treated differently.111 In Powell, the Court only engaged in due process analysis, placing an emphasis
on the fact that the defendants, due to their particular and individual circumstances—their “ignoran[ce]
and illitera[cy]”—were not similarly situated to the average defendant.112 Even though Powell
employed language about the layperson’s lack of legal skill, it did not afford a right to counsel to
them.113 It only afforded a right to counsel to the defendants, as aggravating circumstances made
fairness impossible for the Scottsboro Boys without the assistance of counsel. 114 In contrast, while
Gideon imported the due process analysis and language about a layperson’s lack of skill from Powell,115
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it did not rely on the aggravating particular and individual circumstances in Powell, going so far as to
stop quoting Powell the sentence before it mentions “the ignorant and illiterate.”116 Instead, it divided
defendants into two classes—those who could afford counsel and those who could not—and
emphasized that a disparity between them goes against the “noble ideal” that “our state and national
constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.”117
In short, Gideon expanded Powell by incorporating equal protection into the equation, thus turning it
into an intersectional rights case similar to Griffin and Douglas.
Moreover, a right to counsel exists under Griffin and Douglas independent of Gideon. As a
preliminary matter: although Griffin, Douglas, and Ross all address the distribution of rights and
procedures during the appellate process,118 which is not mandated by the Constitution, nothing in
their opinions limits their logic to constitutionally-optional proceedings.119 The fact that Griffin and
Douglas were decided under equal justice speaks only to the Court’s inability to fit the petitioners’
claims into traditional contours of due process, not the Court’s unwillingness to fit rights found under
traditional due process into equal justice.
In fact, on its merits, the right to trial counsel fits cleanly into the Griffin and Douglas side of
the equal justice line (as opposed to the Ross limitations). In both Griffin and Douglas, the Court’s
concern centered around the impact of wealth on a court’s determination of cases on the merits. 120
That concern would be no different if the issue before the Court was a denial of effective trial
counsel. Moreover, the Douglas court very explicitly extolled the benefits of counsel on appeal,
mentioning “the benefit of counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and
marshalling of arguments on his behalf. . . .”121 If anything, these legal skills—research and
comprehension, applying facts to law, and crafting a cogent argument—are more important at the trial
level, where defense counsel has not yet had the issues winnowed down by a full trial and verdict. In
fact, the focus on correctly determining guilt in lower courts and the benefits of previous assistance
of counsel, along with the fact that defendants initiated appeals (the due process inquiry), were what
distinguished the right to counsel on appeals as a matter of right in Douglas from the nonexistent one
in discretionary appeals in Ross.122 Finally, while equal protection does not require totally equal
conditions, it does require “that indigents have an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly
within the adversary system.”123 Simply put, there are no means of ensuring adequacy and fairness
while still maintaining an adjudicatory, non-inquisitorial system that does not include a right to
116
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counsel. To maintain fairness, anything less than adequate assistance would require either the judge or
prosecutor to take a more active role in the defendant’s argument. This responsibility would impact
the judge’s neutrality or create a conflict of interest for the prosecutor.
B. The Role of San Antonio
While the right to counsel exists under Griffin and Douglas, any successful challenge to
funding for the public defense must satisfy San Antonio’s limits on wealth discrimination claims, which
Griffin and Douglas informed.124 Again, a successful claim must have an easily identifiable class of
indigent individuals who could not pay for a benefit and were thus deprived of it. 125 Eric Wolf, in an
article discussing indigent defense funding under state and federal law, identified San Antonio as a
major limitation on funding challenges:
Indigent defendants are already singled out from the general population as being
criminal defendants and as being poor enough to qualify for appointed counsel.
However, a challenge to a county-based system of defense would still have to show
that such a system provides defendants in poor counties with a quality of
representation sufficiently far below that provided to defendants in rich counties to
constitute discrimination.
...
[E]ven if indigent defendants in poor counties receive a low quality of
representation, whether measured by a relative or an absolute standard, they still
receive some representation. The courts are likely to be unsympathetic to claims by
indigent defendants in poor counties that they get a lower quality of representation
than similar defendants in rich counties.126
Wolf misapplied San Antonio to the right to counsel. First, he unnecessarily stuck too close
to the inter-school district comparison logic the Court could not find to be an identifiable class,127
going for an inter-county public defender comparison.128 A class that is more identifiable and more
reflective of the similar situation requirement in an equal protection analysis would be a comparison
within a county between those that a court found to be indigent and entitled to a public defender and
those with the funds to afford private counsel. More critically, Wolf misstates the benefit as simply
the right to counsel.129 As defined in McMann and refined in Strickland and Cronic, “the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”130 Defining a right to the assistance of
124

San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 20-21.

125

Id. at 20-24.

126

Eric Wolf, The Theory and Application of Equal Protection: Developments in the Right to Counsel, 5 WM. MITCHELL J. L. &
PRAC. 1, 33-34 (2012).
127

See San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 22-28.

128

Wolf, supra note 124, at 33.

129

Id. at 34.

130

McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654.

300

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol25/iss4/3

FUNDING THE UNFUNDED NON-MANDATE
counsel without a measure of effectiveness does lead to Wolf’s conclusion–because defendants are
represented, they are only relatively, rather than absolutely deprived of a benefit. 131 In order to
adjudicate if there is an absolute deprivation of a right to effective assistance of counsel due to
inadequate funding, a reviewing court would need to define effectiveness at a systemic level and
determine if public defenders are systemically ineffective. If they are, then there is an absolute
deprivation due to insufficient funding.
C. Defining Effectiveness
In both Strickland and Cronic, a reviewing court investigated an individual attorney’s alleged
ineffectiveness and embarked on a fact-specific inquiry focused on the attorney’s actions. In
Strickland, the court also examined the impact of those actions on the result.132 In contrast, an inquiry
into a claim that a state absolutely deprives indigent defendants of the effective assistance of counsel
would instead focus on how the state’s actions impact a public defender’s ability to be effective for a
particular group.133 For instance, in Douglas, a case dealing with California’s decision not to provide
counsel to indigent defendants on appeal, the majority only discussed the two petitioners’ stories as a
means of providing procedural history rather than anything more substantial.134 In developing the
case’s holding, the Court generalized and focused on California’s treatment of indigent defendants on
the whole rather than discussing if the petitioners needed counsel for their individual cases, 135
At the same time, Strickland’s definition of effectiveness—” reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms,” with written rules and standards serving as guidelines rather than precedents—is
still instructive.136 Although the Court has expressed concern about over-defining these norms,137 the
practicalities of predicting a budget for a public defender’s office suggest that not every norm needs
to be defined so precisely in an absolute deprivation inquiry. Rompilla v. Beard,138 a case that followed
the Strickland analysis, serves as a good example of this point. Referencing the duty to investigate
under the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice while going through the effectiveness prong, the Court
discussed a general duty to investigate as well as a specific duty under it to look at a prior conviction
file in a death penalty case.139 Applying Rompilla, while it can be predicted that an office will have
cases to investigate and will thus require adequate funds to do that, there is no guarantee that the
office will have a death penalty case where there will be a duty to look at a prior conviction file. In
other words, as a matter of practicality, specific duties created from larger norms would have to fall
into larger categories on a budget rather than show up as line items themselves.
The Strickland definition serves as a broad-strokes baseline for measuring individual
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effectiveness. The absolute deprivation inquiry asks if a state has provided enough resources to allow
public defenders to comply with constant and predictable obligations like “investigat[ing] the
circumstances of the case.”140 It does not ask if the state has provided the total equality the Court
decried throughout its discussions of equal justice.141 It simply serves to provide minimum standards
in line with the “adequate opportunity [for indigent defendants] to present their claims fairly within
the adversary system.”142
IV. A BRIEF EXAMPLE
A. Applying the Theory
Two areas serve as the heavy lifts in applying this framework. First, a proponent must
identify professional norms broad enough to be accounted for and translated into a predictable and
objective measure of compliance. Then, the proponent must show that, at current funding levels, the
public defender system in question is out of compliance. The 2017 study of Louisiana’s public
defense system does exactly that.143
In the study, experts were tasked with coming to a consensus on the time needed to comply
with professional obligations in different types of cases. 144 The study defined professional obligations
in reference to the Louisiana Public Defender Board Trial Court Performance Standards, the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, and the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. 145 Specifically, the
study referred to ABA Criminal Justice Standard for the Defense Function, 4-6.1(b), which
encourages defense counsel to not recommend accepting a plea before “appropriate investigation and
study of the matter has been completed,” as well as Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1(a)
(duty of competence), 1.3 (duty of diligence), 1.7(a)(2) (conflicts of interest between current clients),
1.16(a) (mandatory declination or termination of representation), and 6.2 (avoiding appointments to
stay in compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct).146
While still only guidance, the Supreme Court’s suggested distinction between relying on
national and local standards, its previous reliance on both ABA standards and Rules of Professional
Conduct to define norms, and the widespread acceptance of these basic obligations portend success
in showing that the study measures compliance with professional norms. In Nix v. Whiteside, the
Supreme Court explained some of its hesitation with “constitutionaliz[ing] particular standards of
professional conduct”; doing so “intrude[s] into the state’s proper authority to define and apply the
standards of professional conduct applicable to those it admits to practice in its courts.”147 The Court
did not find this concern to be warranted in Nix, as the issue in the case—whether an attorney acted
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ineffectively by refusing to allow his client to perjure himself 148—had been addressed by the Iowa
Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
and previous iterations of the Model Rules.149 Here, the Louisiana study has the benefit of state
standards like the Louisiana Public Defender Board Trial Court Performance Standards and the
Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, minimizing these federalism concerns.150 Furthermore, the
Louisiana Rules specifically mentioned in the study use the exact same language as the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and have origins in the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. 151
In addition, the Court has previously cited to ABA Criminal Justice Standards, particularly,
defense’s counsel’s duty to investigate.152 The difference between the duty to investigate cited by the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Rompilla and the one referenced in the Louisiana study is only between
the duty to investigate the case before recommending that a client accept a plea and investigating the
case during trial.153 The Supreme Court also relied on ABA Standards in other cases like Wiggins v.
Smith and Williams v. Taylor.154
In short, participants in the Louisiana study relied on professional norms, in combination
with their decades of experience, to develop expected time per case type as a measure of
compliance.155 By then multiplying those figures by the number of cases per type Louisiana public
defenders provide representation for per year, the study calculated the number of hours that public
defenders, as a whole, should be putting in to be compliant with these norms.156 In total, the
estimated annual workload of Louisiana’s public defenders should be approximately 3.7 million
hours, which would require a staff of approximately 1,800 public defenders.157 As of the time of the
study, Louisiana only employed the equivalent of 363 full-time public defenders, demonstrating that
they are not in compliance.158
B. (Re)framing the Issue Post-Covington
The relief sought in this type of equal justice claim is no different than what the Court had
previously granted in Gideon and Douglas—an explicit requirement for counsel, albeit this time explicitly
effective, accompanied by a mandate for legislatures to fund this requirement. However, as Peart
demonstrated, courts are generally hesitant to grant relief this extreme absent a strong showing of
necessity—especially in light of the intrusion into legislative control over funding it would entail.159
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This self-imposed limitation turns the issue into framing the evidence and doctrine in a manner that
gives the court the clarity, willpower, and assurance necessary to grant the requested remedy. In this
regard, by connecting the right to counsel to broader Equal Protection Clause funding cases,
proponents for funding can take advantage of San Antonio and Ross’s outer bounds to give reviewing
courts more assurance that the admittedly radical relief sought is not constitutionally
unprecedented—just another instance of courts requiring the government to pay for equal protection.
Moreover, it gives courts the opportunity to fully understand the true significance of the evidence
provided and use it to its fullest extent—something the Louisiana Supreme Court did not do in
Covington.
The Covington majority failed to consider that, in light of the remedy sought, the individual
findings requirement was just as inappropriate when first imposed in Peart as it was in the case before
them. When assessing Teissier’s allegedly ineffective assistance, the court in Peart, reading the phrase
“ineffective assistance,” decided to directly import the individualized inquiry used in Strickland claims,
a mistake that the court in Covington continued to make, and a federal court is likely to make in the
future.160 However, unlike in Strickland, where a court looks closely at the actions counsel took on
behalf of their (typically former) clients during previous proceedings to determine if that former client
is entitled to individual habeas relief,161 the defenders, due to continued inability to provide effective
assistance, sought relief benefitting the defender’s office (rather than an individual client) on behalf of
their present and future clients as a whole. 162 There was never any need for an individualized
determination when the relief directly benefitted the defender’s office rather than the habeas
petitioner.
Furthermore, even if the court still wanted an individual inquiry about attorney capacity
when assessing a motion for prospective relief benefitting an office instead of a client, it would
inevitably be a duplicative waste of court resources. Within a defender’s office, the triaging of limited
defender resources means that the court will hear the exact same facts and argument in every motion
for either more resources or less client obligation. Briefly stated, Attorney A cannot devote more time
to Defendant 1, because doing so would mean they have less time to represent Defendant 2.
Furthermore, Attorney A cannot pass the case off to Attorney B, because doing so would mean that
Attorney B has less time for Defendants 3 and 4. The names of the clients or defenders in this
equation would change, but every other attorney in the office has the same issue. A systemic inquiry
that looks at the office-wide problem (like the one discussed above), is more reflective of the
problems and indicates a more appropriate solution.
Finally, while the Covington majority was technically correct when it described the Louisiana
study’s finding as not providing case-specific evidence,163 the results of the study164 actually provided
place, this Court, in the exercise of its constitutional and inherent power and supervisory jurisdiction, may find it necessary to
employ the more intrusive and specific measures it has thus far avoided to ensure that indigent defendants receive reasonably
effective assistance of counsel. . . . We decline at this time to undertake these more intrusive and specific measures because this
Court should not lightly tread in the affairs of other branches of government and because the legislature ought to assess such
measures in the first instance.”).
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more relevant information than an individual defendant’s case ever could. The study’s finding that the
Louisiana public defense system operated at twenty-one percent of the capacity needed to provide all
indigent defendants effective assistance necessarily demonstrated that many indigent defendants, even
if not specifically named, go without effective assistance.165 Thus, the defender’s office was not in
compliance with its obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel in all of its representations.
Notably, the dissent in Covington did not make the majority’s mistakes. Noting the
impracticalities of separate hearings and motions on individual cases and the obvious ineffectiveness
of having, for instance, one investigator for 12,167 cases, the dissent rhetorically asked, “[w]hat more
evidence should we require from public defenders before we provide some relief?”166 They pointed
out that absent the large-scale relief sought, the problems will continue and the expenses of
ineffective assistance on human lives, especially marginalized human lives, will accrue.167 Finally,
harkening back to the equal justice framework, the dissent concluded by writing, “[t]here is no equal
justice under law when an innocent poor man is assigned a lawyer who doesn’t even have adequate
access to a computer, but a guilty rich man can purchase an entire legal team who will secure his
acquittal.”168
V. CONCLUSION
Given the inherent difficulty in selling support for a politically unpopular group—indigent
defendants—to elected officials, recent litigation like that in Louisiana is the wise path forward.
However, the fact that many judges are unelected is also a drawback in itself, as they are, for that
reason, reluctant to rock the boat. Seeking the strong remedy needed to fix an underfunded public
defense is an uphill battle. A reframing of the issue as one of systemic disparity is the only way
forward able to show it in its true breadth and depth.
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